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Executive Summary 
This paper makes new estimates of global poverty and inequality in 2012 using both ‘old’, 
2005 and ‘new’, 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) price data. The methodology for the 
2011 PPP data is thought to be superior. However, contentions remain. We discuss the PPPs 
and justify the use of 2011 PPP data to estimate global poverty and inequality, at least for 
comparison purposes.  
Those at the bottom of the global distribution consume no more than they did at a given 
point in time. However, our estimates of the value of what they consume have changed – 
which implies that our poverty lines should change. We argue that far from indicating a 
major change in our understanding of global poverty levels, the new price data merely 
reminds us that very low poverty lines (such as the commonly used extreme poverty line of 
$1.25 a day in 2005PPP) are so hypersensitive that they may not be very robust or useful as a 
measure of real changes in the living conditions of the ‘poor’. In fact, a dime – 10 cents - 
here or there, on or off, a global poverty line, even if it does have an underlying logic to its 
basis, can make a difference to global poverty of the order of 100 million people. This is a 
generic point rather than related to the PPP revision.  
From the point of view of a wider perspective on the global distribution the impact of the 
new PPPs is considerably less substantial than it may have first appeared.  Differences in 
poverty estimates between the PPP rates are much smaller as the poverty line rises above $5 
a day and towards $10 a day, and notably, the number of people living at or below the peak 
of the global distribution curve has remained steady at 33% throughout the period 1990-
2012, being the same whether one uses 2005PPP or 2011PPP.  
The updated PPP figures, we argue, therefore raise questions about the usefulness and 
relevance (again) of relying on any single global poverty line, and especially one that is set 
low, because such estimates of global poverty are hypersensitive to minor changes at the 
lower tail of the global distribution (while not taking into account what is happening across 
the entire global distribution). Furthermore, although global inequality is lower if one uses 
2011PPP, the change is not that large and the much heralded fall in global inequality since 
the end of the Cold War, almost evaporates when China is removed whether one uses 2005 
or 2011 PPPs. Global inequality between countries is about the same as inequality within 
Brazil and global inequality between individuals is still about the same as inequality in South 
Africa.  
We also find that the primary difference in the global distribution between use of 2005 PPP 
and 2011 PPP is less than it may at first seem. The commonality is that the clear global ‘twin 
peaks’ demarcation between a poor peak and a rich peak that existed at the end of the Cold 
War is no longer so readily discernible. We conclude that it is important to consider what is 
happening across a wider range of poverty lines and to understand the (relatively slowly) 
changing shape of global consumption distribution. 
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Approaches to global poverty need to be informed by a broader understanding of the overall 
global consumption distribution and of how very modest changes to the assumed poverty 
line lead to significantly different understandings of the scale and location of global poverty. 
It would therefore be better, we suggest, to make estimates with a range of poverty lines, 
probably up to at least $10-a-day, so as to pay greater attention to the global distribution 
overall.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2014, new price data, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates were released by the 
International Comparison Programme (ICP) based on data collected in 2011. The 
methodology for the 2011 data is thought to be superior to that used to estimate the 
previous 2005 PPP rates. However, contentions remain as to whether the new 2011 PPPs 
should be used for estimating global poverty and inequality. The changes to the PPPs are not 
trivial for many countries and in particular a number of populous countries that matter to 
both global poverty and global inequality estimates have quite different data in 2005 and 
2011 PPPs. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is simple: first, to make new estimates 
of global poverty and inequality up to 2012; and second, to ask how much difference the 
choice of price data makes to estimates of global poverty and inequality. It is worth noting at 
the outset that the PPP revision does not change what people actually consume.  However, 
they do change estimates of the value of what they consume – which also implies that 
poverty line values should change. 
Others have addressed some of these questions with preliminary estimates in blogs taking 
the ‘new’ (2011) PPP and making estimates for global poverty in 2010 based on various 
adjustments to the $1.25 poverty line (e.g. Chandy and Kharas, 2014; Dykstra et al., 2014) 
and find that the new PPP rates substantially reduced poverty estimates at such poverty lines. 
Others made some estimates in blogs of global inequality (Milanovic, 2014), and Inklaar and 
Rao (2014) also make some estimates of global inequality in discussing the robustness of the 
new PPPs, however our paper is, to the authors knowledge, the first systematic attempt to 
make global poverty and inequality estimates over time for 1990-2012 that probe the 
difference price data makes to estimates of global poverty and inequality themselves.1 We 
also make some projections to 2030 for global poverty. It might seem that because the 2011 
PPPs effectively halved estimates of global poverty at the ‘extreme’ global poverty line 
(equivalent to $1.25 a day in 2005PPP) they have caused a major change in our 
understanding of the scale of global poverty. In this paper we demonstrate how the revision 
of the PPPs merely reminds us of the problems of focusing on lower poverty lines where 
poverty estimates are hypersensitive to both the value of the PPP$ poverty line and to 
changes in the value of the PPP rates. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the revision of the PPPs and the use 
of PPPs for the estimation of global poverty and inequality. Section 3 covers our model - the 
Growth, Inequality and Poverty (GrIP) model - and its revision to a version 2.0 (henceforth 
v2.0), in light not only of the new PPP rates but also of the latest survey data additions. We 
also review key methodological limitations in addition to the PPPs drawing from the work of 
Lahoti et al., (2014) and others in Section 4. Section 5 then focuses on how the choice of 
price data generates different pictures of global poverty and inequality. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                            
1 Milanovic (2009) conducted a similar exercise for global inequality when the 2005 PPP data were released. 
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2. Purchasing Power Parity 
Market exchange rates are thought to be misleading for comparisons between countries, 
since, for instance, the price of rice in China is very different to the USA. Purchasing power 
parity (PPP) exchange rates attempt to deal with this problem by estimating the local, rather 
than international, purchasing power of a country’s currency. This is done by comparing 
prices across countries for similar items in order to estimate how many US dollars it would 
cost to buy an equivalent basket of goods in the USA compared to the local in-country cost 
of that basket of goods. These numbers matter for various reasons not least because they 
feed into the estimates of global poverty and global inequality. 
The International Comparison Program (ICP) is responsible for the production of PPP data. 
The ICP was established in the late 1960s on the recommendation of the UN Statistical 
Commission (UNSC). Initially it was conducted by the UNSC and University of 
Pennsylvania and launched in 1968 with the first round in 1970 in 10 countries. The ICP 
2005 round of data collection covered 146 countries. The ICP 2011 data collection covered 
199 countries. Both the 2005 and 2011 rounds were housed by the World Bank Global 
Office with regional offices around the world.  
The 2011 round, released in 2014, has proved contentious as there are some substantial 
changes in countries that are of significance to global poverty and inequality. The 2011 
round was also published three years later than the original ICP timetable. One reason may 
well have been that China fully participated in the 2011 round, following all the procedures 
and methods, but chose not to ‘endorse’ the PPPs estimated for China as official statistics. 
ICP (2014b, p. 27) in the statistical annex notes:  
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China has expressed reservations about 
some aspects of the methodology employed in the 2011 ICP round and did not 
agree to publish the headline results for China. Those results were estimated by the 
2011 ICP Regional Office in the Asian Development Bank and the 2011 ICP Global 
Office in the World Bank. However, the NBS of China does not endorse these 
results as official statistics. 
Given the importance of China to estimates of global poverty and inequality this is 
worthwhile to be aware of. 
The use of the ICP data is endemic in the development community from the UNDP 
estimation of the Human Development Index (of which GDP PPP per capita is a 
component), to the World Bank’s global poverty estimates, to the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook economic growth projections, the Penn World Table, and a range of data in the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
Significant contentions arise, not least over whether it is possible to develop a meaningful 
comparison basket of goods (since what may be considered a staple necessity in one country 
may be a rarely consumed in another) and, of relevance to poverty estimates, whether a 
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basket representative of average consumption habits is appropriate as a measure of the 
buying power of the poor who spend most of their money on food and other necessities). 
Such contentions with the PPPs are by no means new (see, for discussion, Anand and Segal, 
2008; Chen and Ravallion, 2010; Deaton, 2005; 2010; 2011; Deaton and Heston, 2010; 
Deaton and Dupriez, 2011; Edward and Sumner, 2013a; 2013b; 2014; Klasen, 2010; 
Milanovic, 2009; Ravallion et al. 2008).2  
A central issue is that as Deaton and Aten (2014, p. 1) note the 2011 PPPs are ‘sharply 
different’ from what one might have expected based on extrapolation of the 2005 PPP 
round using relative inflation rates for each country. They associate this issue with the 
aggregation method used in ICP2005. Prices were collected and compared across all 
countries in a region. The regions of the world were then linked using a ‘ring’ of 18 countries 
across the regions (the PPPs for these countries were used to link the regions) with at least 
two in each region. The 2005 ring list included a large number of items that were only 
available in rich countries. For example, Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, Zambia and Sri Lanka 
enumerators had to price a 2003 or 2004 vintage bottle of Bordeaux, a front loading washing 
machine with a pre-specified spin speed, and a Peugeot 407 with air conditioning and climate 
control (Deaton and Aten, 2014, p. 18). Such items are - of course - likely to be rare and only 
bought by a small proportion of the population of these countries listed above, and cost 
relatively more in poor countries than in rich countries and thus can lead to an 
overstatement of the price level in poor countries relative to rich countries. In the ICP2011, 
in contrast, all countries had a list of priced items for comparison across countries. The net 
result is that the 2005 PPP round over stated consumption PPPs in Africa, Asia and Western 
Asia region by 20-30%, Deaton and Aten argue (2014, p. 6).  
Inklaar and Rao (2014) concur with Deaton and Aten. They note that because some regions 
are LICs and MICs and others are only HICs, changes to the linking method can shift prices 
in LICs and MICs relative to HICs. Furthermore, Inklaar and Rao find, by constructing a 
counter-factual set of prices based on a harmonized measurement in both periods, that 
changes in the measurement methodology and price sampling between the 2005 and 2011 
ICP survey can explain the substantial differences between the data. Furthermore, and 
‘broadly comforting’ to researchers, as they put it, is that the use of the global core list of 
products from all countries in ICP2011 largely removed the biases of the ICP2005 (Inklaar 
and Rao, 2014, p. 32).  
Ravallion (2014a), though, questions the Deaton and Aten (2014) and Inklaar and Rao 
(2014) thesis regarding the ‘ring’ countries on the basis that most of the variance in 
unexplained revisions are within regions, not between them. Instead, he argues that domestic 
                                                            
2 ICP (2014a; 2014b) notes many if not all of such issues raised in these publications. For example, ICP 
(2014a, p. 21-23, 2014b, p167-170) highlights that PPPs are statistical constructs not precise estimates; that there 
are margins of error on PPPs as a result of sampling and non sampling errors and variability in price and 
economic structures between economies; and that national average prices may be problematic in the analysis of 
large economies with large rural areas and/or rural populations. 
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inflation rates account for a share of the PPP change because the ICP puts greater weight on 
more internationally comparable traded goods than do domestic price indices and that there 
is evidence of a ‘dynamic Penn effect’ whereby economic growth comes with higher prices 
as one might expect rising real wages beyond the Lewis ‘turning point’ at least when the rural 
surplus labour supply is exhausted (see Ravallion, 2010). 
In terms of using 2005 or 2011 PPPs to estimate global poverty, the ICP (2014a; 2014b) 
itself notes in numerous places how PPPs are used for estimates of global poverty and notes 
how each round of new PPPs brings revisions to global poverty and how the new 2011PPPs 
will entail a new global poverty line (2014b, p. 170). The ICP reports themselves (2014a; 
2014b) for the 2011 PPPs note that although there were attempts to measure prices paid by 
the poor and how they differed across economies there is no general agreement on how to 
do so and whether such differences matter so ‘additional research will be necessary’ (ICP, 
2014a, p.24; ICP, 2014b, p. 170), noting that the consumption PPPs are generated by 
ICP2011 to match the national account estimates of consumption. And that the population 
around the poverty line – as is well known - have different consumption patterns to national 
averages (a higher proportion of total expenditure on food). So presumably, the additional 
research would be some adjustment of national PPPs to PPPs near a poverty line. That said 
even though one might assume that PPPs based on actual consumption near an absolute 
poverty line might change the poverty headcount, when Deaton and Dupriez (2011) 
constructed new PPPs for consumption near the poverty line using 2005 PPPs they found 
that there was little difference between PPPs for the consumption of the poor and PPPs 
based on national accounts using the ICP2005. Deaton and Dupriez explain why in 
hindsight this is unsurprising: since the PPP poverty line is (or was) pinned to poverty lines 
in the poorest countries, the use of poverty PPPs would only make a difference if the prices 
faced by the poor in one country were very different from the prices faced by the poor in 
another country (when measured at standard PPPs), which seems (and they note does turn 
out to be) unlikely.   
To date, the World Bank has continued to use 2005PPPs for the global poverty estimates 
published in December 2014 for global poverty in 2011 (see World Bank, 2014). However, 
as noted, others have certainly sought to make some preliminary estimates using 2011PPPs 
for global poverty in 2010 (e.g. Chandy and Kharas, 2014; Dykstra et al., 2014) and for 
global inequality trends (Inklaar and Rao, 2014; Milanovic, 2014). Although World 
Development Indicators has been updated to 2011 PPPs for household final consumption 
expenditure (HFCE) and other economic indicators, the PPP$ country level poverty 
estimates in both WDI and Povcal continue to be derived from the 2005 PPP$.   
In other areas related to global poverty and global inequality the 2011 PPPs are certainly 
superior to the 2005 PPP data collection. For example, efforts were made to ensure adequate 
cover of rural and urban areas to reduce urban bias and China, India and Indonesia all 
conducted nationwide surveys in rural and urban areas, the omission of  which was a 
criticism in previous rounds with reference to poverty measurement. 
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One important issue is raised by Ravallion and Chen (2015) who are much more cautious 
about use of the ICP2011 noting that there have been long standing concerns the ICP 
underweights food, especially poor people’s food shares (and further questions on India’s 
PPP are raised in Ravallion, 2014b). Indeed, they find a sizeable gap between food shares in 
household surveys (2006-present; median 2011) and the food shares in the 2011 ICP, 
especially so at the lower end of the distribution. For example, the ICP2011 food share for 
India is 30% but national household data suggest that the actual share in household 
consumption is 52% for rural areas and 44% for urban areas in India. For the poorest 
quarter of countries the gap is an average of 11.3%. However, the gap for the other three 
quarters of countries is just 5.6% and is zero in most rich countries. Ravallion and Chen 
(2015) do note food shares may be over estimated in household surveys. 
One final and important issue is highlighted by Deaton and Aten (2014, p. 15) who argue 
that there are ‘large, but largely unrecognized’, standard errors relating to uncertainty on how 
relative prices and consumption patterns differ across countries. They note, for example, 
that the standard errors are low (around 5%) for closely related countries such as the US and 
Canada or the US and Western Europe but standard errors are in the order of 20-30% for 
the US to India or US to China comparisons (p. 15) and very large for say Mali versus 
Indonesia or Ethiopia versus China. The implication of these errors, for poverty estimation 
purposes, is that it is important to recognise the potential sensitivity of poverty estimates to 
differences in PPP rates – or, to invert this, another way to approach the same issue in one’s 
analysis is to recognise that when one assumes a given set of PPP rates, it is important also 
to reflect on the sensitivity of poverty estimates to different poverty line values (see later 
discussion). 
In sum, the 2011 PPPs are by no means ideal but they are methodologically stronger than 
the 2005 PPPs which have been used extensively for estimating global poverty and inequality 
and – more importantly – the 2011 PPPs are the best price data currently available to make 
estimates of global poverty and inequality. Deaton and Aten (2014) are unambiguous that 
the 2011 round is ‘superior’ to the 2005 round and that the 2011 round contains many 
methodological improvements over the 2005 round. They argue that the 2011PPPs are ‘the 
most accurate we have, and [we can] provide no ground for doubting them’ (p. 27).  It would 
thus seem reasonable to assume that Deaton’s (2010, p. 31) comment on ICP2005 holds for 
ICP2011:  
PPPs for the poorer countries in Africa or in Asia may be good enough to support 
global poverty counts, at least provided the uncertainties are recognized. Probably 
the most urgent area for the poverty counts is not the ICP, but the improvement in 
the consistency and timeliness of household surveys, and the upgrading of national 
accounts.  
Over the last decade the number of household surveys has certainly increased in frequency 
and a number of countries have upgraded their national accounts.  
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Furthermore, to reiterate, the various pre-2011 PPPs have been used for global poverty 
estimates for about twenty five years since the late 1980s, even though they are now 
recognised as inferior methodologically compared to the most recent 2011PPP rates. We 
would thus argue that, rather than focus on calling into question the 2011PPP rates, a better 
question to ask is under what conditions, or with what caveats, might it be reasonable to use 
the ICP2011 for global poverty and inequality estimates?  
In view of the preceding discussion, we propose two conditions extending that of Deaton’s 
citation above: first, that when estimates of global poverty (and inequality) are presented the 
inherent uncertainties are clearly recognized and discussed at the outset as we have done 
here; and second, that the estimates are not presented as single line estimates of global 
poverty but rather that a range of consumption lines are considered together up to perhaps 
$10 a day.  
3. Model Construction 
3a. Overview 
In this section we outline the model we use to make estimates of global poverty and 
inequality to compare what difference the use of 2005 and 2011 PPPs makes. The Growth, 
Inequality and Poverty (GrIP) model is a custom built model discussed and originally 
developed in Edward (2006), and further discussed (and updated and expanded) in Edward 
and Sumner (2013a; 2013b; 2014). In summary, GrIP is a global model of consumption 
distribution built of data drawn from several datasets (see Table 1) with adjustments made 
for consistency. The principal datasets are: the World Bank’s Povcal; World Development 
Indicators (henceforth, WDI); and the United Nations’ World Institute of Development 
Economics (UNU-WIDER) World Income Inequality Database (henceforth, WIID). While 
the model makes best use of the relevant data in those sources we find that the limited and 
variable coverage in early years means that attempts to construct a global distribution prior 
to 1980 require an excessive degree of estimation and imputation to ‘fill in’ missing data for 
countries where survey or National Account (NA) data is missing. Lahoti et al., (2014) 
propose various ways to do this and GrIP does include ways to make similar estimates.  
However, in this paper, we have chosen not to go back further than 1990, notably because 
the 2011 PPP figures (in WDI) have been backdated but only to 1990. We therefore provide 
here analysis only from 1990, a start point that does however neatly cover a line in history, 
namely the end of the Cold War and the period of contemporary globalisation since that has 
played a role in shaping global economic development.  
GrIP v2.0, as used for this paper, has been updated with the following data that became 
available in late 2014: the Povcal dataset updated on 8 Oct 2014 (which now includes a 
substantial amount of data for higher income countries that previously was sourced in GrIP 
1.0 from Eurostat and other sources); the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset 
updated on 17 Oct 2014 and the WIID3b dataset updated September 2014. In addition, for 
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forecasts beyond 2012 we use the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Oct 2014 
forecasts and the United Nations, Population Division’s (UNPD) World Population 
Prospects (WPP) 2012 Revision (WPP). All data was downloaded between 2 November and 
5 December 2014. In order to compare the current 2011 PPP rates in WDI with earlier 2005 
PPP’s (no longer available in WDI), and because Povcal still cites survey means in 2005 
PPP$, we also use data for the earlier price rates taken from WDI Dec 2013 updated, 
downloaded in Feb 2014 shortly before release of the new 2011PPP rates. In building such a 
model there are a set of issues to be dealt with and we discuss them next before making 
estimates with both the 2005 and 2011 PPPs. 
Table 1: Core components of the GrIP v2.0 model and data sources 
Variables Source and date of update 
Survey distributions, survey means PovcalNet, 8 Oct 2014 
HFCE and GDP in 2011PPP, population 
headcounts, additional survey distributions 
WDI, 17 Oct 2014 
HFCE and GDP in 2005PPP WDI, 18 Dec 2013 
Additional survey distributions WIID3b, Sept 2014 
GDP growth forecasts IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), Oct 
2014 
Population growth forecasts UNPD World Population Prospects (WPP) 
2012 (medium forecast) 
 
The core approach in the GrIP model is to take for each country the distribution data3 and, 
by combining this with data on national population and on the mean consumption per capita 
in internationally comparable PPP $, develop for each country an estimate of how many 
people live at any specific consumption ($-a-day) level in 2005 or 2011 PPP. Having 
identified for each country the number of people living at a given consumption level, GrIP 
then aggregates these to build a global distribution. A wide variety of other aggregations are 
also readily produced; for example, by region or income category as shown in the various 
results presented below. These aggregations can then be interrogated to investigate issues 
such as poverty levels and trends in inequality and the distribution of the benefits of 
economic growth.  
3b. Considerations in construction of the model 
i. Combining distribution surveys with National Accounts data 
To build a global consumption distribution it is necessary to determine (or estimate) for each 
included country a within-country distribution (that is, what percentage of total national 
consumption that is accounted for by different rank-ordered quantiles of the population) 
and how that consumption can be compared and aggregated between countries (that is, a 
                                                            
3 We use published quintile and decile data disaggregated, as described later, into a range of smaller fractiles 
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statement of total national consumption in an internationally comparable currency such as 
PPP$). In GrIP, within-country distributions (quintile and upper and lower decile data) are 
taken, in order of preference, from survey data in Povcal, WDI or WIID. Where WIID is 
used, consumption distributions are used in preference to income distributions. 
Internationally comparable national average (mean) consumption data can estimated from 
survey data or from NA measures (published in WDI). Povcal provides survey means 
(standardised as mean monthly consumption or income) but only for years in which surveys 
exist.4 WDI, on the other hand, typically provides annual NA aggregates, most usefully, 
standardised total national Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE) in 2011 
PPP$ in the current WDI datasets and in 2005 PPP$ in earlier datasets. An extended debate 
exists about whether it is better to build a global distribution of consumption purely from 
survey data (see for discussion, Ravallion, 2003; Deaton, 2005), in which case the model fails 
to take account of information on changes in consumption in the HFCE yearly figures, or to 
combine survey distributions with NA totals, in which case the model fails to take account 
of wildly varying differences between consumption totals derived from survey means and 
HFCE figures from NA data collation – differences that call into question whether survey 
means really are the best way to measure changes in aggregate consumption (see data on 
NA/S ratios below and discussion and comparison on global poverty by NA and survey 
means in Edward and Sumner, 2014). There are arguments for and against each approach so 
GrIP incorporates various ways to combine survey and NA data, and so to allow 
comparisons of results under different assumptions. In this paper, however, our main 
concern is to compare the impact of the choice of 2005 PPP or 2011 PPP on estimates of 
global poverty using a survey mean based approach. 
At the same time, in the interests of building a model that makes best use of available data, 
GrIP also takes account of the HFCE data in WDI as follows. First, for any country that has 
data in Povcal we calculate the NA-to-Survey (NA/S) ratio. For this study, that is the ratio 
of the HFCE aggregate in WDI in the survey year to the total national consumption derived 
from the survey mean in Povcal for the population of the country in the survey year, with all 
terms expressed in 2005 PPP$ since currently that is still the PPP$ used in Povcal.5 As is well 
known NA/S ratios do not unfortunately show a very convincing systematic relationship 
                                                            
4 WIID does also provide some survey means. However, in most cases in WIID the means are missing and 
where they are present they are often stated in diverse units that do not lend themselves readily to international 
comparisons. Where the means are present and clearly comparable and the surveys are considered to be of 
adequate quality, those surveys are usually already in PovcalNet. In cases where this is not the case we rely on the 
survey means in PovcalNet only.  
5 Various NA measures are candidates as the source for the analysis: GDP or Household Final 
Consumption Expenditure (HFCE) being the most useful. In this paper all the figures are based on HFCE (in 
2005 or 2011 PPP$ as stated). Because coverage of GDP data is generally better than that of HFCE data, where 
GDP data exists in WDI but HFCE data does not then the missing HFCE figure is estimated from the GDP 
data. Wherever possible this is done in a given year by applying the most recent HFCE/GDP ratio for the 
country in question. Where no such ratio exists then the average ratio calculated for all countries with suitable 
data in the same region and income category is used.  
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either across countries or even between surveys (See Ravallion, 2003). For example, the 
highest NA/S ratio is found in Turkmenistan in 1993 (NA/S=6.8 on a survey mean of $38 
per person per month in 2005 PPP$) but by the time of the next survey in 1998 this had 
fallen rapidly (to NA/S=1.8 on a survey mean of $84 pppm). The lowest ratio is found in 
Moldova where the NA/S ratio was 0.5 in 1992 although it rose to 1.1 by 1997. Elsewhere a 
number of countries have had NA/S ratios below 1.0 throughout the period since 1990. 
These include: Congo, Dem. Rep.; Comoros; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ethiopia; Guyana; 
Djibouti.6 This is indicative of some of the significant difficulties encountered in the 
endeavour of making estimates of global poverty and inequality. 
GrIP incorporates various ways to combine survey and NA data but because in this paper 
we wish to replicate the survey mean derived approach used in Povcal, throughout this paper 
GrIP calculates the relevant NA/S ratio (in this case the HFCE/Survey ratio) for every 
country/survey year instance and then estimates by interpolation the NA/S ratio for all years 
between surveys. For years since the most recent survey we use the latest NA/S ratio (that is, 
we do not extrapolate changes in NA/S ratios beyond the most recent survey because of the 
danger that trends in NA/S ratios have more to do with ad-hoc methodological differences 
between surveys than with fundamental trends in the ratio of actual ‘like-for-like’ household 
consumption to HFCE). This leaves the problem of countries where additional distribution 
data is available but there are no applicable Povcal means (fortunately a rather more limited 
number of cases than in earlier versions of GrIP since the recent Povcal update now 
includes many higher income countries). For these countries, wherever possible we use a 
NA/S estimate taken from the closest Povcal data if the country in question does have 
surveys. If there are no Povcal surveys for that country then we estimate the NA/S ratio 
from the HFCE value, by using the surveys in Povcal to derive a relationship with the form: 
ܰܣ
ܵ = (ܪܨܥܧ	݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ)
ఈ 
We derive this relationship using only consumption surveys in Povcal and this then enables 
us not only to bring in, with a treatment that is consistent across the years, countries for 
which distribution data exists but survey means are missing or unclear but also to develop 
estimates for countries where there are no survey data.7 
ii. Disaggregating decile and quintile distribution data 
                                                            
6 Values less than 1.0 imply that survey consumption was higher than that reported for HFCE. Intuition is 
that because HFCE theoretically includes expenditure by others (governments and NGOs for example) on behalf 
of households HFCE would be expected to be higher than survey consumption. For fuller discussion of this 
issue see Anand and Segal (2008, p. 67) who argue that surveys are preferable to any NA category, but that if NA 
are to be used then HFCE is preferable to GDP. 
7 We derive this by a log-log regression: log(NA/S) = α . log (HFCE per cap) which yields a value of α = 
0.052. 
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To develop a global distribution, GrIP calculates, from the decile/quintile distribution data 
and across an extensive range of standardised consumption levels, the number of people in 
each country at each consumption level. In earlier versions of GrIP this disaggregation was 
done using a method of linear estimation designed to ensure that decile and quintile totals 
were accurately replicated.  
GrIP v2.0 has the facility to disaggregate distributions using either a linear method (as used 
in earlier versions of GrIP), or the Generalized Quadratic (GQ) and Beta Lorenz functions 
(see Datt, 1998).  
As ever, there are strengths and weaknesses to different approaches. The linear approach 
works well at the lower end of the distribution but at the higher end of the distribution 
(typically the upper quintile: the highest consuming 20%) while it does accurately reproduce 
the totals of these top two deciles it does so at the expense of significant oversimplification 
of the large variations in inequality within those deciles. The GQ and Beta lorenz curve 
functions arguably replicate better (but still not perfectly) the inequality within these highest 
deciles. However because these curve functions are derived from regression estimates they 
tend to be most accurate in the centre of the distribution. At the tails (notably the poorest 
10% and the richest 10%) the proportion of aggregate consumption allocated to the poorest 
and richest deciles can diverge significantly from the input values from which the curve 
functions have been derived (unlike the linear approach which is designed to replicate these 
input values accurately). This gives us particular cause for concern about the use of the GQ 
and Beta functions for poverty estimates, especially when the poverty headcount ratios are 
of the order of 15% or less.8  
We therefore consider that GrIP’s original linear estimation method is more appropriate 
than the GQ or Beta lorenz functions when assessing poverty levels. Except where we 
explicitly provide poverty-related estimates based on GQ or Beta functions for comparative 
purposes, throughout this paper poverty-related estimates (poverty headcounts, and poverty 
gaps) are derived from the linear estimation method. However, when looking at the global 
distribution across all consumption levels (from the world’s poorest to the world’s richest) 
we consider that despite their limitations the GQ and Beta functions are likely to be more 
representative of the distribution within the highest quintile – where in most instances 40% 
                                                            
8 Although until very recently PovcalNet poverty estimates have been based on GQ and Beta lorenz 
functions, the PovcalNet website carries the following warning: ‘PovcalNet was developed for the sole purpose 
of public replication of the World Bank’s poverty measures for its widely used international poverty lines, 
including $1.25 a day and $2 a day. The methods built into PovcalNet are considered reliable for that purpose. 
However, we cannot be confident that the methods work well for other purposes, including tracing out the entire 
distribution of income. We would especially warn that estimates of the densities near the bottom and top tails of 
the distribution could be quite unreliable, and no attempt has been made by the Bank’s staff to validate the tool 
for such purposes’. Furthermore, whereas in the past the datasheets of supporting detail in PovcalNet would 
estimate GQ and Beta parameters from which the decile and quintile data in both PovcalNet and WDI were then 
calculated, in the most recent additions to PovcalNet the World Bank seems to have changed its approach and 
now provides percentile data without any reference to underlying reliance on the GQ or Beta lorenz method. 
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or more of national consumption occurs. Therefore, unless explicitly stated otherwise, in this 
paper analysis that covers the full range of global consumption (in density curves, growth 
incidence curves, and ginis) is derived from the GQ and Beta lorenz functions. Where these 
functions are used the function adopted (GQ or Beta) in each case (country and year) is the 
one that is the best-fit, using a least squares test, to the input decile/quintile data (in most, 
but not all, cases this turns out to be the GQ function).9 
iii. Extending data to global coverage 
Consumption (or income in some cases) surveys do not take place annually so in the GrIP 
model distributions for intermediate years, between surveys, estimates are calculated by 
interpolation, while in years subsequent to the most recent survey, or prior to the earliest 
survey, the distribution is assumed to remain unchanged from that survey.10 Where a country 
has no usable surveys, or the gaps between surveys are too great to allow reliable 
interpolation,11 the GrIP model can ‘fill’ a country’s missing distributions with a distribution 
estimated from other similar countries. This means that the analysis can either be ‘filled’ to 
more closely replicate global population and consumption totals, or ‘not filled’ to include 
only the smaller set of countries for which national distribution data is available.12 The GrIP 
model fills missing distribution data by taking estimates from averages (not population 
weighted) for the year in question for other countries in the same region and income 
category, or if there is insufficient data for that then by taking estimates from averages for all 
other countries in the same income category.13 For these countries we also estimate an 
appropriate survey-equivalent consumption using the NA/S-to-HFCE relationship 
described above.  
This means that in GrIP there are two main processes used to supplement the Povcal data 
so as to increase the coverage of countries into a truly global distribution. First, where 
additional usable distributions are available from other sources (WDI and WIID) they are 
added in and survey equivalent means are estimated using a NA/S estimate taken from the 
closest Povcal data if the country in question does have surveys in Povcal and otherwise 
                                                            
9 Tests are also carried out to ensure that the functions are actually valid lorenz functions – that is, to check 
that consumption levels increase as one moves up the distribution curve. Despite the fact that the regression 
analysis is based on a function for which in theory this should automatically be the case it is not always so. 
10 See Dang et al., (2014) for discussion of such issues.  
11 In this paper we assume that a survey is usable for interpolation if it took place within 12 years of the year 
in question. If no interpolation is possible then a survey is considered usable if it took place within 7 years of the 
year is question, in which case the distribution is used unadjusted but means are adjusted in line with changes in 
HFCE. 
12 PovcalNet only uses distributions where the population unit is the individual, not household. WDI 
reproduces PovcalNet distributions and, in the case of data not in PovcalNet, World Bank staff have (as stated in 
the notes to WDI) made an effort to ensure that the data are as comparable as possible. For this reason we 
consider that the distributions in GrIP are already as well aligned as possible to the individual rather than the 
household. 
13 Income categories and regions are the same as those used in the current WDI. Where a region/income 
category has no other countries in the same income category with usable distribution data then the assumed 
distribution is the average for all countries globally in the same income category. 
14 
estimated from the NA/S-to-HFCE relationship. Second, where a country has no usable 
distribution an approximate distribution is estimated from regional and income category 
averages and combined with an appropriate estimate, derived from NA data and global 
relationships, of average consumption. Despite the uncertainties involved in these methods 
we consider that this is a more justifiable approach, both for estimating poverty and for 
considering global inequality, than alternatives where either the non-Povcal countries are 
simply omitted or it is assumed that regional poverty figures can be estimated by scaling up 
pro-rata for missing populations (an approach that can be bold in regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa where the Povcal data includes only 73% of the total population). 
These two processes enable us not only to produce an analysis that closely resembles the 
survey-based methodology of Povcal but also to extend that analysis to build a global 
consumption distribution. The extent of coverage of the GrIP analysis, and the impact of 
the various stages in extending this coverage is summarised in Table 2 and illustrates how 
GrIP represents a global model of consumption distribution incorporating over 96% of the 
global population. Process 2 figures for HFCE coverage exceed 100% because the WDI 
2011PPP figure for global total Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE)  is 
actually slightly lower than the sum of the HFCE figures for the individual countries. 
Nevertheless the table demonstrates that GrIP effectively provides close to total coverage of 
global population and consumption. 
Table 2: Coverage of population and HFCE in GrIP v2.0 before and after filling by 
2011 and 2005 PPP 
 2011PPP 2005PPP 
No. of 
countries 
Population HFCE No. of 
countries
Population HFCE 
PovcalNet coverage 
1990 110 88.1 82.5 110 88.1 81.1 
2012 111 86.9 77.3 109 85.8 73.4 
Process 1: additional distributions from WDI and WIID 
1990 130 94.0 97.3 128 93.8 96.9 
2012 145 94.6 96.5 143 93.5 94.6 
Process 2: Filled with estimates for countries with no survey 
1990 175 96.8 100.6 169 96.4 99.0 
2012 192 98.1 100.8 180 96.5 98.0 
Source: GrIP v2.0.  
Of course outputs from any such model can only ever be best-estimates based on the 
judicious use of the at times limited and frequently highly variable data sources. Some testing 
of sensitivity to different assumptions is therefore called for. One feature of GrIP is that it 
has been developed to allow ready comparison of different assumptions. One key 
comparison is between analyses using survey-based means (as used for Povcal and in World 
Bank poverty estimates) or those that apply survey distributions to NA data directly. Such 
comparisons were first made in the early-to-mid 2000s by Deaton (2005), Ravallion, (2003) 
and Sala-i-Martin (2002). More recently, Edward and Sumner (2014) used GrIP v1.0 with 
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2005PPP data to highlight the importance of adjusting poverty lines to take account of 
systemic differences between survey and NA data and to demonstrate how these different 
approaches lead to substantially differing views on the geography (meaning location) and 
scale of global poverty. In this paper we only use the survey-based approach. We do not 
revisit the survey-vs-NA difference because our focus in this paper is on the impact of the 
new 2011 PPP data on poverty estimates derived from survey means as that is the approach 
used in Povcal. 
4. Methodological Contentions 
4a. The Raw Data 
There are several issues arising from the quality and variety of the underlying raw survey data 
that cannot readily be adjusted for in the model. We have already discussed some of the 
difficulties in disaggregating decile and quintile distribution data and in relating survey means 
to NA data. The wide variance in NA/S ratios may well arise because national distribution 
data is derived from surveys that vary in their approach between countries and over time 
(although increasingly improvements are being made to standardise these surveys). For 
example, distribution surveys may be based either on income or consumption (see earlier 
discussion). They may be produced either for individuals or for households and income 
surveys may be gross (pre-tax) or net (post-tax). In theory these differences should be 
adjusted for but in practice the variances are so large and the size of the datasets so limited 
that it is currently difficult to make reliable adjustments. 
The problem is compounded because even when survey methods seem to be similar the 
results can still show considerable variation between surveys so that the comparability of the 
surveys can also be questionable. For example, according to surveys the consumption share 
of the poorest 10% in Uganda rose from 1.9% in 1989 to 3.2% in 1996 before dropping 
again to 2.4% in 1999. It is hard to believe that such wide and rapid variations really do 
reflect sudden changes in actual distributions. More likely they arise in large part from the 
inherent variability between surveys and/or from changes to survey techniques and 
instruments. Unfortunately there is no way to adjust for these uncertainties, nor to know 
which surveys are the more ‘reliable’, so analysis is compelled (as with all other estimates of 
global poverty and inequality) to rely on the published survey data. Confronted with such 
variability it becomes difficult, and potentially largely spurious, to try to identify relationships 
in the survey data that might support robust adjustments for detailed differences in survey 
approach. Instead we largely follow standard practice of noting these differences without 
attempting to adjust for them.  
ii. Adjusting for differences between consumption and income based surveys  
We do adjust for the likely significant difference between surveys that are consumption 
based and those that are income based. There is likely to be a systematic difference between 
such surveys but in the past many analyses of global poverty inequality, including earlier 
16 
versions of GrIP, have not made any adjustment (e.g. Edward and Sumner, 2014).. The main 
reason for this was that within Povcal there is only a rather limited set of countries with both 
income and consumption surveys that could be used to develop a comparison method to 
adjust for the income-consumption survey difference, so the adjustment was considered to 
be rather speculative. In the current version of GrIP (v2.0) we are now able to introduce this 
adjustment. This has become more feasible with the latest update of WIID which contains a 
much larger number of comparable income and consumption surveys. 
The seminal paper of Deininger and Squire (1996) developed adjustments for consumption 
to income measures.14 More recently, and using the latest WIID, Lahoti et al (2014) identify 
120 instances in the WIID dataset where there is both a consumption and an income survey 
reported by the same statistical agency in the same year for a country. From these they 
estimate conversion factors to transform quintile data from income surveys to consumption-
equivalent values. We have not repeated their calculations instead we have used the more 
limited set of Povcal surveys to develop comparable estimates (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Conversion factors for adjusting income survey data 
 Estimate ‘a’ 
 
 
Source: 
PovcalNet 
Estimate ‘b’ 
 
 
Source: 
PovcalNet 
Estimate ‘c’ 
 
Source: Lahoti 
et al., (2014) 
No. of matched surveys in sample 25 39 120 
No. of countries in sample 8 15 Not stated 
Decile 1 (D1) 1.399 1.598 1.386 * 
Quintile 1 (Q1) 1.196 1.318 1.185 
Quintile 2 (Q2) 1.045 1.091 1.150 
Quintile 3 (Q3) 1.030 1.048 1.120 
Quintile 4 (Q4) 1.014 1.011 1.060 
Quintile 5 (Q5) 0.966 0.936 0.860 
Decile 10 (D10) 0.955 0.919 0.851 * 
Sources: GrIP v2.0 and Lahoti et al., (2014); Note: * = data estimated by authors 
In table 3, estimate ‘a’ is where income and consumption surveys are in the same year. 
Estimate ‘b’ is where an income survey exists within one year of the consumption survey. 
Despite using a much more limited dataset, these estimates broadly confirm Lahoti et al.’s 
figures and demonstrate that as one would expect consumption distributions are less unequal 
with a higher proportion of the distribution accruing to the lower fractiles. In this paper we 
thus have adopted Lahoti et al.’s adjustments (because they use a much larger dataset) and 
                                                            
14 They developed adjustments for Q1 to Q5 and suggested adjusting Gini coefficients by 6.6 to make 
consumption Ginis comparable with income Ginis. More recently Niño-Zarazúa et al., (2014, p.11) suggest 
adding 7.8 points to the consumption Gini though 6.6 lies within the 95 per cent confidence interval of their 
estimate of 7.8 they note. They also run a similar exercise to adjust consumption quantile shares to income 
quantile shares. 
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supplemented them by our own estimate (derived from estimates ‘a’ and ‘b’) for the lowest 
and highest deciles as these are not stated by Lahoti et al. We would note though that a 
substantial degree of uncertainty remains over this relationship (see discussion in Atkinson 
and Brandolini, 2001).   
It is not sufficient however merely to adjust the fractile estimates. An adjustment also needs 
to be made to reduce the income aggregate to render it comparable to consumption 
aggregates (the reason being some income, particularly for those in the higher fractiles, 
becomes savings rather than consumption). Our approach to this problem is to return to the 
calculation of the NA/S-to-HFCE relationship (discussed above) but this time calculate the 
NA/S-to-HFCE ratio using only income surveys (whereas previously it was calculated using 
only consumption surveys). This allows us to use all the surveys in Povcal (of which over 
500 are income based and over 600 are consumption based as opposed to the much more 
limited set of fewer than 40 matched income and consumption surveys) to estimate a 
relationship between consumption and income based NA/S ratios as follows:15 
൬ܰܣܵ ൰௖௢௡௦௨௠௣௧௜௢௡ = ൬
ܰܣ
ܵ ൰௜௡௖௢௠௘ × (ܪܨܥܧ	݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ)
ఉ 
All results presented in this paper include this adjustment of income surveys to consumption 
equivalents. 
iii. Adjustment for ‘top incomes’ 
A further issue is that of the highest earners in a society, often labeled as an adjustment for 
‘top incomes’ data. It is widely recognised that the share of the distribution that accrues to 
the top percentiles can be substantial judging by data from the Paris School of Economics’ 
Top Incomes Project (which is based on taxation data). It is also recognised that the top of the 
distribution is not well captured in the household survey data (see for discussion, Korinek et 
al., 2006). At least two methods have been proposed recently to take account of this. Some 
scholars have attempted to adjust for ‘top incomes’ by assuming that discrepancies between 
survey and national account (NA) data are entirely due to underreporting by the richest (e.g. 
Lakner and Milanovic, 2013). Others develop assumptions on the missing ‘top incomes’ by 
drawing on the work of Thomas Piketty and Tony Atkinson and others on top incomes 
based on tax data (e.g. Anand and Segal, 2014).  
We discuss these approaches below while noting that there is also a further issue of untaxed 
income or illicit financial flows that also ought to be taken into account but has not yet been 
attempted (neither in GrIP nor in other similar models) because it remains difficult to 
quantify. 
                                                            
15 See discussion in Deaton (2005) who analyses the issue in detail. We estimate the factor β = -0.024. 
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The first method of adjustment is that of Lakner and Milanovic (2013). This approach 
assumes that the difference between NA means and survey means goes to the top 10% and 
then they uss a Pareto distribution to allocate that sum across the top 10%. The main issue 
with such an approach is that it assumes that all the difference between survey and NA 
means is due to under reporting by the rich. That is an important assumption, not least 
because the NA consumption figures are calculated as a residual (ie a difference between 
other figures) (see Anand and Segal, 2008, p. 69) so that measurement errors elsewhere in 
the national accounts may have a significant influence here. This is supported also by the 
observation that in some cases/countries the NA consumption figures are actually lower 
than survey means - a situation that rather undermines the logic that the national accounts 
HFCE vs. survey mean difference is simply due to underreporting by the richest. 
Furthermore, the justification for allocating the difference to the top 10% is open to 
question. Lakner and Milanovic recognise (2013, p. 15) these issues and caution that their 
‘estimates should be seen as an approximate first step’. Certainly one can have sympathy for 
the approach on the basis that it is a valiant attempt to approach a difficult issue. It does 
though raise further questions about the cause and allocation of the NA to survey mean 
difference. 
Alternatively, Anand and Segal (2014) use a different, and more plausible, method by 
assuming that very rich households are simply excluded from surveys in order to incorporate 
top income data into their survey distributions: 
We assume that the survey data in the Milanovic dataset represent only the bottom 99% of the 
population in each country. Accordingly we multiply the population in each income group in the 
surveys by 0.99, and append the top percentile with its income share from the tax data (assuming 
that its share of ‘control’ income is equal to its share of survey income). The exclusion of the top 
percentile implies that mean income in the surveys is underestimated, and our procedure results in a 
corresponding increase in mean income for each country (p. 20). 
This is an interesting approach since it combines the poverty survey means measures of 
incomes from tax data, rather than relying on the difference between survey means and NAs 
as an imputation of ‘missing’ top incomes. It does, however, require one to combine 
consumption and income (tax) data while the choice of the top 1% is a convenient 
assumption - because if one took it down to say the top 10% (‘top incomes’ data is currently 
available from the Top Incomes Project for the top 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.01%) then 
the estimation technique would need to be more complicated to allow for inequality across 
the top 10% (such as Lakner and Milanovic’s use of a Pareto distribution to allocate 
‘missing’ consumption across the top 10%). Furthermore, data on top incomes is only 
available for 30 countries, of which Anand and Segal found that only 18 to 23 had applicable 
data for any individual year in their analysis. 16 This raises the issue of how to extrapolate that 
data to the complete set of countries in the dataset. To do this, Anand and Segal estimate a 
                                                            
16 See: http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/#Database: 
19 
relationship between the share of the top 10% and the survey mean in the national survey 
distribution and that of the top 1% in the income tax data - effectively implying that the 
share of the top 1% can be predicted from the survey data.  
Our conclusion from reviewing these approaches is that, for the purposes of this paper, with 
its focus largely on global poverty estimates and the impact of the PPP rate changes, the 
existing approaches to the top incomes issue are rather speculative so we do not include here 
any adjustment for ‘missing’ top incomes. In any event, the issue does not affect 
consideration of global poverty counts because the ‘missing’ consumption is assumed to 
occur only at the top of the distribution well above the poverty lines we consider. It does, of 
course, impact on global inequality estimates. The inequality estimates in this paper therefore 
reflect only the values derived from surveys and PPP rates. While this may be a reasonable 
basis for estimating overall trends in inequality it should be recognised that if the 
consumption of the ‘missing’ top income earners’ was (somehow) included the absolute 
inequality values would be higher.  
 
5. New Estimates of Global Poverty and Inequality: How Much 
Difference Does the Choice of Price Data Make? 
5a. How Do GDP and Consumption Differ by Price Data Taken? 
 
A point of departure in the consideration of the impact of different price data is to ask what 
impact does it make to use 2005 PPP or 2011 PPP in terms of levels and location of 
consumption and output? As illustration, if one takes the 2011 PPPs, the USA is the largest 
economy (GDP = $16.0 trillion in 2012 in 2011 PPP) and China the second largest (GDP = 
$14.5 trillion in 2012 in 2011 PPP). The new PPP rates have significantly narrowed the gap 
between these two countries. China’s GDP is 91% of USA GDP using 2011 PPP, whereas it 
was 76% using 2005 PPP data. India is the world’s third largest economy using 2011 PPP 
(GDP = $6.2 trillion) or 39% of USA by 2011PPP versus 29% using 2005 PPP data. One of 
the biggest changes is to Indonesia (GDP = $2.2 trillion by 2011 PPP) whose economic size 
more than doubles if one uses 2011PPP versus 2005 PPP, lifting it from 15th largest to 10th 
largest economy in the world. 
At a global level, world GDP (in 2012) can be re-estimated from $73 trillion (2005 PPP) to 
$96 trillion (2011 PPP) and household final consumption expenditure  (HFCE) from $39 
trillion (2005 PPP) to $50 trillion (2011 PPP) (see Table 4). What this means is that since the 
end of the Cold War (1990 to 2012) rather than $37 trillion of new GDP generated (in 2005 
PPP) the figure is $50 trillion new GDP (in 2011PPP). In percentage terms, and irrespective 
of whether we use 2011 PPP or 2005 PPP or whether we consider GDP or HFCE, the size 
of the global economy doubled between 1990 and 2012 (in all these cases 1990 values are 
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between 49% and 52% of 2012 values). Global growth is slightly higher with the new set of 
PPPs because of the higher weight of faster-growing developing economies. 
Table 4: Survey, HFCE and GDP totals ($ billions), 2011 PPP and 2005 PPP 
 Survey GDP HFCE 
 
Countries 
in GrIP 
Countries 
in GrIP 
Global 
total 
GrIP 
coverage
Countries 
in GrIP 
Global 
total 
GrIP 
coverage
2011PPP        
1990 16,785 45,083 46,159 97.7% 24,396 24,251 100.6% 
2012 31,450 94,314 95,825 98.4% 50,347 49,939 100.8% 
Change 14,664 49,232 49,666  25,951 25,687  
Change 
(as % of 
2012) 
46.6 52.2% 51.8%  51.5% 51.4%  
2005PPP        
1990 13,349 35,537 36,270 98.0% 19,446 19,633 99.0% 
2012 23,686 71,031 73,251 97.0% 38,046 38,824 98.0% 
Change 10,338 35,494 36,981  18,600 19,190  
Change 
(as % of 
2012) 
43.6 50.0% 50.5%  48.9% 49.4%  
Source: GrIP v2.0 
These figures are all for National Account totals. Of significance to global poverty estimates 
is what has happened to global consumption when measured by survey means (or, when 
there is no survey and as described earlier, by NA figures adjusted to align to survey means). 
Here we find that, for the countries included in GrIP v2.0, consumption by survey means 
rises from $17 trillion in 1990 to $31 trillion in 2012 in 2011 PPP (versus $13 trillion and $24 
trillion respectively in 2005 PPP). Survey data therefore indicates that global consumption 
grew by $15 trillion, or 46% (versus $10 trillion or 44% by 2005 PPP) which is rather slower 
than the NA growth rates but nevertheless it is $5 trillion more consumption than previously 
thought. This is substantially more than if the 2005 $ were simply inflated to 2011 $ which, 
for example, for survey consumption could inflate $10.3 trillion of growth to $11.9 trillion 
whereas the 2011 PPP changes increased this figure by approximately $2.8 trillion ($14.7 
minus $11.9) or just over 20%. 
At recent rates (2010-2012), taking 2011 PPPs, global consumption is growing at just over $1 
trillion a year (survey mean) and that growth in consumption is accounted for largely by 
China (640bn or 28% of the growth). The other major countries showing survey 
consumption growth are the USA and India (250bn and 220bn respectively – meaning that 
with China they account for 50% of the global consumption growth). Russia, Brazil, 
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are next on the list and together with China, USA and India 
account for just over two-thirds of global survey consumption growth.  
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Table 5: Household final consumption expenditure, 2012, 2005PPP versus 2011PPP 
 Change 
2011PPP to 
2005PPP 
(%) 
HFCE ($ billions) 
 In 2011PPP 2005PPP 
inflated to 
2011PPP 
In 2005PPP
World 14.0 49,939 43,807 38,824 
Regions  
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 24.5 12,250 9,839 8,720 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 4.0 12,423 11,941 10,582 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) 15.9 5,062 4,369 3,872 
Middle East & North Africa 
(MNA) 
48.0 2,791 1,886 1,671 
North America (NAM) -0.4 11,726 11,773 10,434 
South Asia Region (SAR) 44.0 4,668 3,242 2,873 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 63.2 1,718 1,053 933 
E Asia excl. China 24.5 12,231 9,825 8,708 
S Asia excl. India 44.0 4,668 3,242 2,873 
  
Income category  
All High  2.6 28,009 27,309 24,202 
Upper middle 25.7 13,213 10,513 9,317 
Lower middle 52.8 8,567 5,608 4,970 
Low 38.5 976 705 624 
  
Population 100m or more  
2012 population. (millions)  
China  1,351  33.4 4,950 3,711 3,289 
India  1,237  39.2 3,605 2,591 2,296 
United States  314  0.0 10,945 10,945 9,700 
Indonesia  247  57.1 1,043 664 588 
Brazil  199  18.4 1,555 1,313 1,164 
Pakistan  179  86.4 618 332 294 
Nigeria  169  216.4 526 166 147 
Bangladesh  155  43.0 251 176 156 
Russia  143  20.1 1,750 1,457 1,291 
Japan  128  2.4 2,498 2,438 2,161 
Mexico  121  -0.3 1,126 1,130 1,001 
Philippines  97  50.6 403 267 237 
Source: GrIP v2.0 Note: To maximise consistency with WDI HFCE data, the inflator used is the 
value implicit in the USA HFCE data in WDI. This is slightly less than the inflator that would be 
estimated from US CPI for the same period (1.128 compared to 1.152). 
In terms of specific and populous countries that matter either to global poverty or global 
inequality estimates, a number of developing countries saw substantial adjustments to their 
HFCE as a result of the PPP revisions (See table 5 for the twelve countries with population 
of more than 100m people).17 The upward revisions particularly affect low income and lower 
                                                            
17 HFCE, rather than GDP, figures are provided because these changes are the ones that directly affect the 
GrIP model. In one case (Tanzania, since 2011) the old HFCE 2005PPP figures in WDI are so different, both to 
previous years and to the equivalent published values now stated in 2011PPP, that they are considered unreliable. 
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middle income sub-Saharan Africa (although the sub-Saharan Africa figure needs some 
caution as the HFCE percentage increase of 63% reduces to 34% if Nigeria is taken out). In 
terms of developing countries and of substantial importance to global poverty and global 
inequality estimates, China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan all had large PPP revisions 
the effect of which is to reduce estimated poverty levels at any given poverty line taken.  
5b. How Does Global Inequality Differ by Price Data Taken? 
Next we can consider who benefited and by how much from global growth since 1990 and 
how much difference use of 2005 or 2011 PPP makes. In terms of the global growth 
incidence curve for 1990-2012, Figure 1 presents the distribution of benefits using 2005 PPP 
and 2011 PPP (respectively $10 trillion or $15 trillion of new consumption generated 
between 1990 and 2012.  
Figure 1: Relative benefits: Global growth incidence curve, survey means, 1990-2012 
(2011PPP unless stated) 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Recent 2011PPP seems more reliable so the old 2005PPP figures have been adjusted manually based on growth 
rates since 2010 derived from the 2011PPP data. 
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Figure 2a. Absolute benefits: Global growth incidence curve, survey means, 1990-2012 
(2011PPP unless stated, linear scale) 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
Figure 2b . Absolute benefits: Global growth incidence curve, survey means, 1990-
2012 (2011PPP unless stated, log scale)  
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
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Several points are noteworthy. First, if one compares the entire 1990-2012 period, our 
estimates of the distribution of benefits of economic growth differ relatively little whether 
one uses 2005PPPs or 2011PPPs: in the poorest half of the global population, the curve rises 
slightly – perhaps in the order of 10% if one uses 2011PPPs rather than 2005PPPs. This 
might sound significant but in absolute terms it is small (see Figure 2). Second, what is 
noticeable in Figure 1 is that, regardless of the PPP rates used, in the 1990s, as globalization 
took off, the global upper middle (70-90 percentile) saw their consumption per capita 
stagnate, and maybe even decline slightly, before recovering somewhat in the 2000s.18  In 
short, one might say that the (relative) winners and losers of global growth were different in 
the 1990s and 2000s (a point noted for 2005 PPPs by Lakner and Milanovic, 2013, p. 31).  
Next, we consider what the PPP change meant for three concepts of global inequality (see 
Figures 3 and 4) as measured by the Gini coefficient. First, global within-country inequality. 
Within-country inequality Gini coefficients are independent of international comparator 
rates so are not affected by changes in PPP rates.19 Second, global between country 
inequality. Third, inequality based on all the individuals in the world. The 2011PPP rates 
resulted in a reduction in estimates of global inequality across the period due in large part to 
the increase (relative to the 2005PPP rates) in aggregate consumption of many of the larger 
developing and emerging economies (cf. Table 5). At a regional level too there are some 
major distribution changes (see Table 6).  Some of the regional between-country Ginis 
change significantly. For example, the Gini for inequality between countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa changes from 0.387 in 2005 PPP to 0.299 in 2011 PPP. 
However, although one might say that global inequality is lower than previously thought 
using 2011PPP (compared to 2005PPP) data, it is also the case that the change is not that 
large. In 2012, global inequality between individuals, measured by the Gini coefficient (see 
annex table A3) was 0.61 using 2011PPP (or 0.63 excluding China) rather than 0.65 using 
2005PPP (or 0.68 excluding China) and global inequality between countries was 0.49 using 
2011PPP (or 0.52 excluding China) rather than 0.56 using 2005PPP (0.58 excluding China).  
To put these into some kind of context, a Gini coefficient of 0.61 (2011PPP) for global 
inequality between individuals in 2012 is close to the inequality level of South Africa in 2012 
and a Gini coefficient of 0.49 for global inequality between countries is close to inequality in 
Brazil in 2012. In short, global inequality between individuals is about the same as inequality 
in South Africa and global inequality between countries is about the same as inequality 
within Brazil.  
                                                            
18 Milanovic (2012, p. 13) and Lakner and Milanovic (2013, p. 31) present a global growth incidence curve. 
The primary difference to Figure 1 is that over the 20 year period of 1988-2008 they show no real growth in 
consumption at the 80th percentile. GrIP also identifies this region as the area of lowest growth for the period 
from 1990 to 2000 but estimates that this stagnation did not continue in the period from 2000 to 2012. .  
19 This would not be the case for the within-country component of the Theil T, because that is an income-
weighted average of within-country inequalities.  
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We estimate more of a decline than earlier estimates (see Anand and Segal, 2008) based on 
all surveys currently available. However, the fall in global inequality from 1990-2012 almost 
evaporates once China is removed from global inequality estimates: global inequality 
excluding China between individuals fell from 0.66 to 0.63 (2011PPP) or 0.69 to 0.68 
(2005PPP). And global inequality between countries excluding China fell from 0.54 to 0.52 
(2011PPP) or 0.60 to 0.58 (2005PPP). This point about China and global inequality has been 
made previously by various scholars and most recently Niño-Zarazúa et al., (2014) who 
provide a detailed discussion on the impact of China and India on global inequality. 
In sum, the choice of PPPs used makes some difference but not a great deal. The levels of 
global inequality are high and trends without China show global inequality is barely falling 
between 1990 and 2012 whether 2005 PPP or 2011 PPPs are used. Also notable, although 
not impacted by PPP changes, is just how little global inequality measured as aggregate 
within country inequality has changed between 1990 and 2012 (irrespective of whether China 
is included or excluded).  
Figure 3: Effect of PPP rates on evolution of global Ginis 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
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Figure 4: Effect of PPP rates on evolution of global Ginis (excluding China) 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
Table 6: Estimates of regional Gini coefficients, 2012 by 2005 and 2011PPP  
 Between individuals Between countries Within 
countries 2005 
PPPs 
2011 
PPPs 
2005 
PPPs 
2011 
PPPs 
East Asia and Pacific  0.552 0.515 0.419 0.354 0.380 
EAP excl. China 0.629 0.578 0.510 0.446 0.394 
Europe and Central Asia 0.459 0.440 0.284 0.247 0.362 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  
0.530 0.529 0.130 0.122 0.515 
Middle East and North 
Africa  
0.485 0.441 0.331 0.270 0.347 
North America  0.466 0.467 0.010 0.010 0.466 
South Asia Region  0.355 0.363 0.080 0.112 0.342 
SAR excl. India 0.344 0.361 0.126 0.176 0.312 
Sub-saharan Africa  0.567 0.523 0.387 0.299 0.431 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Data based on survey means, income surveys adjusted;  we calculate the 
within-country Gini directly from the distribution with between country consumption difference 
removed by setting all countries to the same average consumption per capita in the GrIP model; we 
calculate the between country inequality by removing all within country inequality in the GrIP model 
 
What we think the above points towards is that when one considers the global distribution 
curve in its entirety, the primary difference in the global distribution between use of 2005 
PPP and 2011 PPP is less than might first appear to be the case.  
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The commonality (across 2005PPP and 2011PPP) is that the ‘twin peaks’ world identified by 
Quah (1996) seems to be disappearing as the ‘middle’ between the peaks fills out. However, 
with the consumption curve plotted (see Figures 5 and 6), the world can be seen to be 
divided still into a large number of people centered around a relatively poor population peak 
and a much smaller number of richer people accounting for the global consumption peak – 
although the clear demarcation between these peaks (the concavity in the richer tail of the 
population curve and in the poorer tail of the consumption curve) that existed at the end of 
the Cold War is no longer so readily discernible. The figures below can be read thus: above 
the horizontal axis are standard density curves, while the curves below the horizontal axis are 
calculated as the density multiplied by the level of consumption, to show the total amount of 
consumption at that point. So while the area under each curve above the axis represents the 
total global population, the area under each curve below the axis represents total global 
consumption.20   
In terms of the PPP revision itself from 2005 to 2011 PPPs, most of the additional 
consumption growth resulting from a shift from 2005PPP to the 2011PPP rates is 
concentrated in the region between the population peak and the consumption peak. The 
consumption peak has also not moved much relative to global population and occurs at the 
93rd or 94th percentile throughout the period whether one uses 2005 or 2011PPP. In short, 
the new PPPs are less of a substantial change if one looks at the entire global distribution. 
Figure 5: Global distribution curve, 1990 and 2012 by 2005 and 2011 PPPs 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: The $1.25 a day line is the $2005PPP line rebased to its $2011PPP value. 
                                                            
20 For a fuller description of how to interpret these distribution curves see Edward and Sumner (2014). 
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Figure 6: Global distribution curve without China, 1990 and 2012 by 2005 and 2011 
PPPs 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: The $1.25 a day line is the $2005PPP line rebased to its $2011PPP value. 
5c. How Does Global Poverty Differ by Price Data Taken? 
 
As noted at the outset of this paper, one of the biggest and most contentious questions after 
each PPP revision is what has happened to estimates of global poverty. In making the 
estimates below, we are not arguing that any of these poverty lines should be used.  
We are simply saying that applying this logic gives you a global poverty cut-off such as this, 
and this is how many people are estimated to live below that level. In fact, our conclusion is 
that global poverty is so hypersensitive to very modest changes in the value of the lower end 
‘poverty’ lines that, when a monetary poverty line is considered in isolation (from other lines 
or other measures of poverty), they may not be an enlightening measure of real changes in 
the living conditions of the poor. One possibility would be to stick with a given set of PPPs 
(e.g 2005 PPP) and poverty line (e.g. $1.25), and simply update each country using its own 
real growth rate. On this method you can be fairly confident of changes in poverty within a 
country, although not of the exact meaning of the level of poverty when compared between 
countries. 
 
The issue is illustrated in Figure 7 which zooms in on the lower part of the population curve 
for 2012 using 2005PPP and 2011PPP. The area beneath each curve and to the left of the 
vertical poverty lines is proportional to the poverty headcount. It can be seen that at the 
$1.25 line the 2011PPP headcount is much lower than the 2005PPP headcount. But up at 
the $10 line the difference is relatively small.  
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
<=
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
    
   
  D
en
si
ty
    
   
  P
op
ul
at
io
n 
=>
Income ($ PPP per capita pa) - log scale
1990 2005PPP 
2012 2005PPP 
1990 2011PPP 
2012 2011PPP 
$1.25 (2005PPP)
$2.5 (2011PPP)
$10 (2011PPP)
29 
It is at the peak of the curve that a shift in the line makes the greatest difference to absolute 
poverty numbers but since this region lies close to both the 2005PPP and 2011PPP peaks 
changes in the poverty line near here do not lead to dramatic differences in poverty 
headcounts (meaning the proportion of population) between the PPP rates. This is because 
the change in headcount for a modest change in poverty line value is proportional to the 
height at which the distribution curve crosses the poverty line, and the two curves cross the 
$2.5 line at similar heights. However, as the line moves into the lower tails of the curves this 
height difference increases, both in absolute terms and proportionately. As a result, the $1.25 
line is currently well down into the region of the distribution curve where the differences 
between the 2005PPP and 2011PPP headcounts become most acute (Figure 8). If higher 
poverty lines are considered the differences start to look considerably less significant.  
Over-attention to a single poverty line headcount can therefore exaggerate the amount of 
change that has occurred with the move to 2011PPP rates and can divert attention away 
from more intractable poverty issues that only become apparent by considering other 
poverty lines or by reflecting on the overall shape of the distribution curve. For example, if 
one focuses on the number of people living at or below the peak of the distribution curve 
this turns out to have remained steady at about a third of the global population throughout 
the period 1990-2012 (and this is the same whether one uses 2005PPP or 2011PPP), and 
thus a lot less has changed for the poor than might be implied from the falls in lower 
absolute global poverty numbers as a result of the PPP revision.  
We argue therefore that the updated PPP figures raise questions about the usefulness of 
focusing predominantly on any individual global poverty line, and especially one that is set 
low because such estimates of global poverty are hypersensitive to minor changes at the 
lower tail of the global distribution while blind to what is happening across the entire global 
distribution. 
To reiterate from Section 2 of this paper, any estimates of global poverty need to be read 
with the inherent uncertainties in mind as we have identified. Second, as argued above, and 
although Deaton and Dupriez (2011) constructed new PPPs for consumption near the 
poverty line using 2005 PPPs and found that there was little difference between PPPs for the 
consumption of the poor and PPPs based on national accounts using the ICP2005, we 
would argue here that any estimates of global poverty are best viewed as a range of poverty 
lines (especially so given the point on food shares made by Ravallion and Chen, 2015).  
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Figure 7: Global population distribution curve (detail), 2012 by 2005 and 2011 PPP
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: The $1.25 a day line is the $2005PPP line rebased to its $2011PPP value. 
Figure 8: Ratio of 2005PPP to 2011PPP poverty headcounts at different poverty lines 
Source: GrIP v2.0.  
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With all of the above caveats in mind, the first question is how to revise what was the global 
poverty line of $1.25 in 2005 PPP? The World Bank who historically declares and endorses 
particular $PPP poverty lines, could of course consider the 2011 PPP values of all the 
current national poverty lines of developing countries and take a mean (or median) of the 
poorest or all developing countries as done previously. Here we outline five other 
possibilities which have a global logic of some kind and/or have been proposed by others 
(see table 7). What the discussion points towards is that any poverty line set low will generate 
hypersensitive estimates of global poverty regardless of the logic underlying any line.  
So even if a new global poverty line is the mean or median of all developing country 
national poverty lines (or some of them) it is going to be very sensitive to small changes. 
As we discuss below, for poverty lines of this order 10 cents one way or another can 
make the difference of 100 million people, which should at least caution one against 
over-reliance on any individual poverty line at this level. 
Several other scholars have proposed lines and we discuss these now. One method to adjust 
the $1.25 (2005 PPP) poverty line would be by US Consumer Price Index (CPI) as per 
Dykstra et al., (2014).  
A second method is to take the average poverty line for the poorest 15 countries as per the 
basis of the $1.25 poverty line (See Ravallion et al. 2008) or the average poverty line for the 
current poorest 15 countries or the average of the two averages as per Chandy and Kharas 
(2014). This is basically the same as the World Bank setting previously.  
A third method is to take the same number of poor people as per $1.25 in 2010 in 2005 PPP 
and consider what would be a ‘same number of poor’ poverty line in 2011 PPP. This would 
be about $2. A fourth method is that one could set a global monetary poverty line equivalent 
to the estimated level of global multi-dimensional poverty of 1.6bn people in 2010 (OPHI, 
2014). That would give a poverty line of $2.50.  
Finally, one could take a $10 poverty line which is a proposal for a ‘security from poverty’ or 
‘middle class’ consumption line developed and used by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) 
based on the 10% probability of falling back below national poverty lines (which are $4-
$5/day in 2005PPP) in the near future in Mexico, Brazil and Chile. The 10% probability line 
is actually $8.50-$9.70 depending on whether Brazil, Mexico or Chile are used (and 
comparable estimates for Indonesia are $8.37 for a $4 national poverty line and $13.03 at $5, 
in 2005 PPP - see Sumner et al., 2014). Thus, the mean is $9.27 and if the mean is inflated to 
2011 prices it is $10.47. However, given that this is not intended to be a precise estimate - 
rather a rough proxy used for illustration purposes here - we have kept it as $10 per capita 
(2011PPP).  
One could easily raise some serious questions over the logic of these poverty lines. The 
critique of using US inflation to estimate the consumption of the poorest countries has been 
well discussed (see earlier references to Deaton), as has taking the poverty lines of the 
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poorest 15 countries (again see earlier references to Deaton). It may be more logical to take 
the number of poor under the $1.25 (2005PPP) poverty line or the number of multi-
dimensionally poor globally to set a new (2011PPP) line though they may not be exactly the 
same people. Though in the latter, those may not be the same people there is comparative 
value of considering monetary poverty alongside multi-dimensional poverty. Finally, the $10 
line will differ across countries in terms of a ‘vulnerability to poverty’ based on the national 
poverty line, depending on the PPP$ value of the national poverty line. However, such a 
higher line might be much less sensitive to future PPP revisions and $10 is the consumption 
at the top of the poorest decile in OECD HIC countries in 2012 (2011 PPP) which would 
mean it might qualify as a genuinely global poverty line. 
Table 7: Global Poverty Lines in 2005 PPP and 2011 PPP 
Global poverty 
line  
Logic 
 
$1.25 (2005 PPP) Average poverty line of 15 poorest countries in 2008 
$1.44 (2011 PPP) $1.25 adjusted by US inflation (as per method of Dykstra et al., 2014) 
$1.78 (2011 PPP) Average of the average poverty line for poorest 15 countries when the 
line was established and current poorest 15 (as per method of Chandy 
and Kharas, 2014) 
$2 (2011 PPP) ‘Same number of poor’ poverty line (same number of poor as per 
$1.25 in 2010 in 2005 PPP) 
$2.50 (2011 PPP) Monetary poverty line equivalent to estimates of multi-dimensional 
poverty in 2010 
$10 (2011 PPP) A 'security from poverty' line (Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014) 
 
In sum, we have chosen to focus on this set of poverty lines because others have proposed 
them ($1.44 and $1.78) or because they have some underlying global logic ($2, $2.50 and 
$10). It would be best to view these lines for what they actually are, which is simply 
consumption cut-off levels rather than ‘poverty’ lines. Figures 9-13 compare estimates for 
these poverty lines in terms of poverty headcounts and the poverty gap (as a percentage of 
global GDP) and we add projections for 2030 poverty based on assumptions for growth and 
inequality (see figures 12 and 13). The projections in these figures are simply for illustration 
of what the $2.50 and $10 poverty headcounts might be in 2030 based on a range of 
scenarios. 
If one considers the global distribution curve above, the peak (mode) of the global 
population distribution in 2012 is at approximately $3.50 a day in 2011PPP and there are 
2.3bn people below that. Using 2005PPP the peak in 2012 is at the $2.14 in 2005PPP or 
$2.46 in 2011PPP.  
Taking 2011 PPPs, in 2012 there are 450m people below $1.44 but another 1bn people 
between that $1.44 line and a $2.50 line and almost another billion people between that 
$2.50 cut off and the $3.50 peak. Furthermore, there are 3.2bn people between $2.50 and 
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$10 (or 2.5bn people between $3.50 and $10) who arguably are perhaps not destitute or day-
to-day poor but may still not be living secure lives free from the risk of poverty (See also 
annex table A9). 
Table 8: The distribution of global poverty by various poverty lines (millions of 
people), 2012 
 $1.25 
(2005 
PPP) 
$1.44 
(2011 
PPP) 
$1.78 
(2011 
PPP) 
$2 (2011 
PPP) 
$2.50 
(2011 
PPP) 
$10 
(2011 
PPP) 
Total 982 449 745 963 1,447 4,695 
       
India 273 94 200 288 484 1,198 
China 71 20 59 85 145 939 
       
East Asia and 
Pacific exc. China 
61 9 31 50 95 470 
Europe and Central 
Asia  
9 8 11 14 21 212 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  
46 37 50 59 81 377 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
6 0 2 4 11 230 
North America  5 5 6 6 8 37 
SAsia exc. India 84 26 49 67 115 390 
Sub-saharan Africa 426 251 337 390 487 843 
       
LICs 318 215 298 350 446 726 
LMICs 536 170 326 453 751 2,286 
LMICs minus India 263 76 126 165 267 1,088 
UMICs 120 57 112 149 236 1,523 
UMICs minus China 49 37 53 64 90 584 
       
LDCs 343 220 307 362 464 784 
Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States  
143 102 129 147 178 327 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Current income classifications (2014); Fragile States = World Bank definition; $10 
figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz functions. All others based on linear model.  
In sum, any new global poverty line set low runs the risk, given the density of population, 
that a dime (10 cents) here or there in the poverty line taken could be equivalent to a change 
in global poverty by, a not insignificant, 100 million people. And given that the risk of 
poverty could extend up to $10-a-day (or beyond) rather than thinking of global poverty in 
the order of 1-1.5 billion people, something in the order of more than 4.5 billion people 
might be more appropriate, or at least recognition that the 1.5 billion people under a $2.50 
line, sit alongside more than another 3 billion people who may be at risk of poverty, living 
on consumption in-between the $2.50 to $10 range (which is still below the US poverty line 
value in 2011 PPP) and poor when compared the poorest decile in OECD HIC countries. 
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Figure 9: Estimates of global poverty at various poverty lines, millions, 1990-2030 
using 2011PPP (projections from 2012 based on IMF WEO minus 1% and current 
inequality trends)
 Source: GrIP v2.0.Note: The $1.25 a day line is the $2005PPP line rebased to its $2011PPP value. 
Figure 10: Estimates of global poverty excluding China at various poverty lines, 
millions, 1990-2030 using 2011PPP (projections from 2012 based on IMF WEO minus 
1% and current inequality trends) 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: The $1.25 a day line is the $2005PPP line rebased to its $2011PPP value. 
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Figure 11: Estimates of global poverty gap (as a % of global GDP) at various poverty 
lines, 1990-2030 (log scale) (projections from 2012 based on IMF WEO minus 1% and 
current inequality trends) 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
Figure 12: Estimates of global poverty at $10/day and $2.50/day using IMF WEO 
growth projections and various distribution scenarios, 1990-2030
Source: GrIP v2.0. Notes: ‘Optimistic’ = IMF WEO growth projections; ‘Moderate’ = IMF WEO growth 
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projections minus 1%; ‘Pessimistic’ = half IMF WEO growth projections; ‘Extrapolated’ = inequality trend 
extrapolated; ‘Best historic’ = if inequality were to return to the lowest level of inequality since 1990. 
Figure 13: Estimates of global poverty gap at $10/day using IMF WEO growth 
projections and various distribution scenarios, 2010-2030
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
In short, focusing on low poverty lines, given the density of population, becomes very 
questionable given the hypersensitivity of any estimates to even small changes in the value of 
the poverty line taken and may distract attention from the fact global poverty at $10-a-day 
(which is still below the US poverty line) amounts to more than 4 billion people. While this 
may sound bleak, the cost of ending global poverty at $10 a day could fall to just 5% of 
global GDP by 2030 (based on the IMF WEO growth projection for each country minus 
historical error and contemporary inequality trends by each country – our moderate growth 
scenario) (see Figure 13). Further, if inequality were to fall to the lowest point in each 
country’s post-Cold War period and growth met IMF WEO projections (our optimistic 
growth scenario) the number of people living under $10 would fall to 3.7 billion in 2030 and 
the cost of ending $10 poverty would fall to just 3% of global GDP.  
The PPP revision also changes the location of global poverty depending on the poverty line 
used. In short, as noted by Deaton, lower poverty lines ‘Africanise’ poverty and very 
marginally higher poverty lines ‘Asianise’ poverty (see figure 14). One could add to this that 
lower poverty lines also shift global poverty away from middle income countries to low 
income countries (and UN LDCs), and from non-fragile states to fragile states (as noted 
previously using 2005PPPs in Edward and Sumner, 2013a, 2014). Conversely, only very 
slightly higher poverty lines shift the burden of global poverty towards MICs and countries 
not defined as fragile states or UN LDCs (see table 7 and figures 15 and 16).  
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Figure 14: The distribution of global poverty (% global total) by region, 2012, by 2005 
PPPs and 2011 PPPs 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0.  
Figure 15: The distribution of global poverty by country income category and World 
Bank definition of Fragile States, 2012, by 2005 PPPs and 2011 PPPs 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
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Figure 16: The distribution of global poverty by country income category and 
OECD-DAC definition of Fragile States, 2012, by 2005 PPPs and 2011 PPPs 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0. 
The setting of global poverty lines thus determines who counts as poor and where they live 
and given that very marginally higher lines change levels and locations of global poverty we 
would argue that the use of lower poverty lines is problematic. One could also say that when 
one compares the 2005 and 2011PPP charts there does not seem to be that much difference 
other than over where one might draw the poverty lines. Of course one could also say that at 
any given poverty line there are fewer people living under that line when the 2011PPPs are 
used. 
However, we would argue that this is an issue of the poverty line taken rather than that the 
new PPPs really changed the global consumption distribution that much overall. Again, this 
might lead one to say that the ICP2011 was less of a revision than it may have first appeared. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have made new estimates for global poverty and inequality, 1990-2012 (and 
some projections to 2030) in order to ask how much difference the choice of price data 
makes to those estimates of global poverty and inequality. On the one hand one could say 
that global inequality is less than previously thought – meaning it is less using 2011PPP than 
using 2005 PPP data - but one could also say that the change is not that large. In short, 
global inequality between individuals is about the same as inequality in South Africa and 
global inequality between countries is about the same as inequality within Brazil. 
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Furthermore, the falls in global inequality from 1990-2012 almost evaporate once China is 
removed from global inequality estimates.  
In sum, the choice of PPPs used makes some difference but not a great deal and the levels 
of global inequality remain very high. Furthermore, trends without China show global 
inequality is barely falling whatever PPPs are used. That said, although the world can be seen 
to be divided still into a large number of people centered around a relatively poor population 
peak and a much smaller number of richer people accounting for the global consumption 
peak, the clear demarcation between these ‘twin peaks’ that existed at the end of the Cold 
War is no longer so readily discernible.  
Those at the bottom of the global distribution consume no more than they did at a given 
point in time. All that has happened is that our estimates of the value of what they consume 
have changed – which implies that our poverty lines should change. The new price data 
merely reminds us that very low poverty lines are so hypersensitive that they may not be very 
robust or useful as a measure of real changes in the living conditions of the poor. We find 
that around the one or two dollars-a-day level an extra dime can add 100 million to the 
global poverty count raising some serious questions as to whether this hypersensitivity 
undermines any global poverty line set around that level.  
Further, it is worth noting that lower poverty lines not only Africanize global poverty, but 
they also push global poverty into fragile states and the poorest countries by income per 
capita, low income countries, while a few dimes more or barely higher global poverty lines 
Asianize or push global poverty away from fragile states and the world’s poorest countries.  
When one looks at slightly higher poverty lines it becomes apparent that a lot less has 
changed for the poor than might be inferred from the falls in extreme ($1.25 a day) poverty 
numbers due to the new PPPs. Differences in poverty estimates between the PPP rates are 
much smaller as the poverty line rises above $5 a day and towards $10 a day, and notably, the 
number of people living at or below the peak of the global distribution curve has remained 
steady at 33% throughout the period 1990-2012, being the same whether one uses 2005PPP 
or 2011PPP. From the point of view of a wider perspective on the global distribution the 
impact of the new PPPs is considerably less substantial than it may have first appeared. 
The updated PPP figures we argue therefore raise questions about the usefulness and 
relevance of relying on a single global poverty line, and especially one that is set at a very low 
level because such estimates of global poverty are hypersensitive to minor changes at the 
lower tail of the global distribution while blind to what is happening across the entire global 
distribution.  
In conclusion, our aim in this paper is not to argue for or against any particular poverty line. 
The issue here is more about how the new PPP rates expose the sensitivity of poverty 
estimates to PPP estimates, particularly at poverty lines below around $5 a day (with 
sensitivity increasing as the poverty line is reduced below this value). This value easily 
40 
exceeds any global absolute poverty line that is likely to be proposed in the near future for, 
for example, the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In view of the inherent uncertainties 
in PPP estimates it is important therefore not to become too reliant on any single poverty 
line.  
Approaches to global poverty need to be informed instead by a broader understanding of 
the overall global consumption distribution and of how very modest changes to the assumed 
poverty line lead to significantly different understandings of the scale and geography or 
location of global poverty. It would therefore be better, we suggest, to make estimates with a 
range of poverty lines, probably up to at least $10-a-day, so as to pay greater attention to the 
global distribution overall and to the distribution of the growth increment.  
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Table A1: Changes in 2012 GDP values on the introduction of 2011PPP rates 
 
 Change 2011PPP to 
2005PPP (%) 
GDP ($ billions)
 In 2011PPP 2005PPP inflated to
2011PPP 
In 2005PPP
World 16.6 95,825 82,176 73,251
  
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 18.4 28,459 24,032 21,422
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 11.7 23,832 21,337 19,019
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) 19.5 8,740 7,314 6,519
Middle East & North Africa (MNA) 51.2 6,905 4,566 4,070
North America (NAM) 0.2 17,413 17,379 15,492
South Asia Region (SAR) 37.1 7,696 5,614 5,005
Sub-saharan Africa (SSA) 36.5 2,895 2,120 1,890
E Asia less China 18.5 28,437 24,007 21,400
S Asia less India 37.1 7,696 5,614 5,005
  
High Income 6.9 50,226 46,987 41,884
UMIC 22.2 30,287 24,785 22,093
LMIC 46.6 14,155 9,658 8,609
LIC 19.5 1,361 1,139 1,016
Population 100m or more (2012 popn in millions)  
China 1,351 20.5 14,529 12,058 10,748
India 1,237 34.8 6,245 4,635 4,131
United States 314 0.0 15,965 15,965 14,232
Indonesia 247 84.8 2,186 1,183 1,054
Brazil 199 24.4 2,845 2,287 2,039
Pakistan 179 61.8 781 483 430
Nigeria 169 102.0 893 442 394
Bangladesh 155 29.9 366 281 251
Russia 143 36.6 3,337 2,444 2,178
Japan 128 -1.1 4,450 4,497 4,009
Mexico 121 11.3 1,972 1,771 1,579
Philippines 97 40.8 581 412 368
Note: To maximise consistency with WDI HFCE data, the inflator used is the value implicit in the USA HFCE data in WDI. This is slightly less than the inflator that 
would be estimated from US CPI for the same period (1.122 compared to 1.152). 
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Table A2: 2012 Global poverty estimates with and without income surveys adjusted to align to consumption surveys, 2005 and 2011 PPP 
 Poverty headcounts (% of global total)  Poverty headcounts (millions)
 $1.44 (2011 PPP) $2.50 (2011 PPP) $10 (2011 PPP)
 
 $1.44 (2011 PPP) $2.50 (2011 PPP) $10 (2011 PPP)
 
 Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
 Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
Not 
adjuste
d 
Adjuste
d 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  422 449 1,405 1,447 4,567 4,695
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 6.8 6.5 17.0 16.6 30.5 30.0  29 29 238 240 1,394 1,409
EAP exc China 2.0 2.0 6.6 6.6 10.0 10.0  8 9 93 95 455 470
Europe and Central Asia  1.4 1.7 1.3 1.5 4.0 4.5  6 8 18 21 185 212
Latin America and Caribbean) 4.1 8.3 3.7 5.6 6.9 8.0  17 37 52 81 314 377
Middle East and North Africa  0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 5.0 4.9  0 0 11 11 226 230
North America  0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.8  0 5 0 8 17 37
South Asia Region (SAR) 28.3 26.6 42.6 41.4 34.8 33.8  119 119 599 599 1,588 1,588
SAR exc India 6.1 5.7 8.2 8.0 8.5 8.3  26 26 115 115 390 390
Sub-saharan Africa  59.4 55.8 34.6 33.6 18.5 18.0  251 251 487 487 843 843
India 22.2 20.9 34.4 33.4 26.2 25.5  94 94 484 484 1,198 1,198
China 4.8 4.5 10.3 10.0 20.6 20.0  20 20 145 145 939 939
   
LICs 50.7 47.8 31.7 30.8 15.9 15.5  214 215 445 446 726 726
LMICs 39.6 37.8 53.1 51.9 50.0 48.7  167 170 746 751 2,281 2,286
LMICs minus India 17.4 16.9 18.7 18.5 23.7 23.2  73 76 262 267 1,084 1,088
UMICs 9.6 12.8 15.1 16.3 32.0 32.5  40 57 212 236 1,461 1,523
UMICs minus China 4.8 8.2 4.8 6.2 11.4 12.4  20 37 67 90 522 584
LDCs 52.0 49.0 33.0 32.1 17.2 16.7  219 220 463 464 784 784
Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
States (World Bank definition)  
24.0 22.8 12.6 12.3 7.1 7.0  101 102 177 178 327 327
 
  
47 
Table A3: Estimates of global inequality, 1990-2012 by 2005 and 2011PPP 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2006 2012
Between individuals 
Global, 2011PPP 0.676 0.685 0.667 0.643 0.605
Global (excl. China), 2011PPP 0.658 0.664 0.671 0.659 0.629
Global, 2005PPP 0.713 0.721 0.707 0.686 0.653
Global (excl. China), 2005PPP 0.693 0.700 0.708 0.700 0.678
 
Between countries 
Global, 2011PPP 0.579 0.594 0.576 0.537 0.488
Global (excl. China), 2011PPP 0.544 0.558 0.572 0.551 0.517
Global, 2005PPP 0.627 0.641 0.625 0.597 0.561
Global (excl. China), 2005PPP 0.595 0.607 0.620 0.607 0.582
 
Within countries 
Global, 2011PPP 0.381 0.401 0.393 0.396 0.391
Global (excl. China), 2011PPP 0.399 0.403 0.404 0.405 0.396
Note: Data based on survey means, income surveys adjusted. 
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Table A4: Global poverty headcount and gap, 1990-2030 (2011 PPP) 
 
 
Headcounts (millions) 
 
PL 1990 1995 2000 2006 2012 2020 2025 2030
$1.25 (2005PPP) 1,145 1,340 977 717 449 286 247 209 
$1.78 (2011PPP) 1,629 1,762 1,452 1,123 745 511 392 344 
$2 (2011PPP) 1,931 2,034 1,745 1,382 963 677 521 434 
$2.5 (2011PPP) 2,381 2,521 2,307 1,935 1,447 1,087 873 693 
$10 (2011PPP) 3,992 4,375 4,663 4,786 4,695 4,826 4,760 4,613 
  
Headcounts excl. China (millions) 
PL 1990 1995 2000 2006 2012 2020 2025 2030
$1.25 (2005PPP) 686 716 730 621 429 282 246 209 
$1.78 (2011PPP) 991 1,046 1,078 960 686 478 372 329 
$2 (2011PPP) 1,176 1,249 1,293 1,174 878 625 484 405 
$2.5 (2011PPP) 1,521 1,640 1,712 1,607 1,302 990 799 634 
$10 (2011PPP) 2,861 3,184 3,452 3,652 3,755 4,066 4,133 4,104 
  
Poverty gap (% of global GDP) 
PL 1990 1995 2000 2006 2012 2020 2025 2030
$1.25 (2005PPP) 0.39 0.51 0.24 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 
$1.78 (2011PPP) 0.77 0.90 0.49 0.28 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.05 
$2 (2011PPP) 1.09 1.20 0.70 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.07 
$2.5 (2011PPP) 1.97 2.03 1.31 0.80 0.45 0.26 0.18 0.13 
$10 (2011PPP) 23.19 22.75 19.03 14.35 10.66 8.20 6.59 5.12 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: $10 figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz functions. All others based on linear model. 2030 figures are based on the moderate 
economic growth scenario and extrapolated inequality trends.  
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Table A5: Global poverty, 1990 (2011 PPP) 
 
 $1.44 $1.78 $2 $2.50 $10
 Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP)
Total 1,145 22.4 0.4 1,629 31.9 0.8 1,931 37.8 1.1 2,381 46.6 2.0 3,992 78.1 23.2
Total exc 
China 
686 17.3 0.3 991 24.9 0.5 1,176 29.6 0.7 1,521 38.3 1.3 2,861 72.0 16.5
Regions     
EAP 547 31.7 0.9 772 44.8 1.9 919 53.3 2.7 1,078 62.5 4.9 1,535 89.0 51.2
ECA 12 1.5 0.0 24 2.9 0.0 33 4.0 0.0 56 6.7 0.1 337 40.6 3.3
LAC 70 15.9 0.4 91 20.8 0.6 104 23.9 0.8 134 30.7 1.3 344 78.8 18.6
MNA 4 1.8 0.0 9 3.9 0.1 13 5.6 0.1 23 9.9 0.2 165 72.6 12.8
NAM 1 0.2 0.0 2 0.6 0.0 2 0.8 0.0 4 1.4 0.0 31 11.2 0.3
SAR 309 27.5 1.7 485 43.1 4.1 586 52.2 6.1 778 69.2 12.1 1,112 99.0 149.6
SSA 202 41.2 3.6 247 50.2 5.9 274 55.6 7.7 310 63.0 12.0 468 95.1 107.1
     
China 459 40.5 3.8 638 56.2 7.7 755 66.5 10.9 860 75.7 19.4 1,132 99.7 187.9
India 231 26.5 1.6 369 42.5 4.0 449 51.7 6.1 600 69.0 12.2 861 99.1 154.3
Current 
Classifications 
    
HIC  4 0.4 0.0 7 0.7 0.0 10 0.9 0.0 18 1.6 0.0 234 21.1 1.0
UMIC 536 28.5 0.9 746 39.6 1.8 884 46.9 2.5 1,033 54.8 4.5 1,705 90.5 50.0
LMIC 407 23.6 1.0 629 36.5 2.3 764 44.3 3.5 1,020 59.2 6.8 1,666 96.8 90.4
LIC 198 50.2 9.3 247 62.5 15.5 274 69.5 20.2 310 78.6 32.3 387 98.0 259.2
LDC 210 49.6 8.2 261 61.6 13.7 290 68.6 17.8 330 77.9 28.4 416 98.3 230.2
Fragile States 55 37.0 4.3 66 44.8 6.9 72 48.5 8.7 84 56.9 13.5 141 95.4 129.4
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Current income classifications (2014); Fragile States = World Bank definition; $10 figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz functions. 
All others based on linear model. 
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Table A6: Global poverty, 2012 (2011 PPP) 
 
 $1.44 $1.78 $2 $2.50 $10
 Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Total 449 6.5 0.1 745 10.8 0.1 963 13.9 0.2 1,447 21.0 0.5 4,695 68.0 10.7
Total exc 
China 
429 7.7 0.1 686 12.3 0.2 878 15.8 0.2 1,302 23.4 0.5 3,755 67.6 10.5
Regions     
EAP 29 1.4 0.0 90 4.2 0.0 135 6.3 0.1 240 11.3 0.2 1,409 66.1 9.5
ECA 8 0.8 0.0 11 1.2 0.0 14 1.5 0.0 21 2.4 0.0 212 23.7 1.2
LAC 37 6.3 0.1 50 8.4 0.2 59 10.0 0.2 81 13.5 0.4 377 63.1 8.6
MNA 0 0.1 0.0 2 0.5 0.0 4 1.0 0.0 11 2.8 0.0 230 58.1 4.9
NAM 5 1.3 0.0 6 1.7 0.0 6 1.9 0.0 8 2.3 0.0 37 10.5 0.3
SAR 119 7.2 0.1 249 15.1 0.4 355 21.5 0.7 599 36.3 1.8 1,588 96.3 49.9
SSA 251 28.1 1.5 337 37.8 2.8 390 43.7 3.8 487 54.6 6.6 843 94.6 77.2
     
China 20 1.5 0.0 59 4.4 0.0 85 6.3 0.1 145 10.8 0.2 939 69.5 11.6
India 94 7.6 0.1 200 16.1 0.4 288 23.3 0.7 484 39.1 1.8 1,198 96.8 47.4
Current 
Classifications 
    
HIC  7 0.6 0.0 10 0.8 0.0 11 0.9 0.0 15 1.2 0.0 160 12.5 0.3
UMIC 57 2.4 0.0 112 4.7 0.1 149 6.2 0.1 236 9.9 0.2 1,523 64.0 9.0
LMIC 170 6.8 0.1 326 13.0 0.3 453 18.0 0.6 751 29.9 1.3 2,286 91.0 37.0
LIC 215 28.9 3.1 298 40.1 5.7 350 47.2 7.9 446 60.1 14.0 726 97.8 165.4
LDC 220 27.4 2.4 307 38.1 4.4 362 45.0 6.1 464 57.7 10.9 784 97.5 132.9
Fragile States 102 28.2 1.5 129 35.7 2.6 147 40.6 3.4 178 49.1 5.7 327 90.1 63.1
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Current income classifications (2014); Fragile States = World Bank definition; $10 figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz functions. 
All others based on linear model.  
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Table A7: Global poverty, 2030 (2011 PPP) projection: moderate growth scenario (IMF WEO minus 1%) and extrapolated inequality trend 
 
 $1.44 $1.78 $2 $2.50 $10
 Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Mills % 
popn 
Pov 
gap (% 
GDP) 
Total 209 2.5 0.0 344 4.1 0.0 434 5.2 0.1 693 8.3 0.1 4,613 55.5 5.1
Total exc 
China 
209 3.0 0.0 329 4.8 0.1 405 5.9 0.1 634 9.2 0.2 4,104 59.8 6.2
Regions     
EAP 9 0.4 0.0 26 1.1 0.0 41 1.7 0.0 85 3.6 0.0 917 38.1 2.3
ECA 6 0.7 0.0 7 0.8 0.0 8 0.9 0.0 11 1.2 0.0 149 16.2 0.6
LAC 35 5.0 0.1 44 6.3 0.1 51 7.3 0.2 67 9.6 0.3 373 53.3 5.8
MNA 3 0.7 0.0 6 1.2 0.0 9 1.8 0.0 15 3.0 0.0 248 49.2 3.1
NAM 9 2.3 0.0 10 2.6 0.0 11 2.7 0.0 13 3.1 0.0 42 10.3 0.2
SAR 1 0.0 0.0 6 0.3 0.0 10 0.5 0.0 70 3.5 0.0 1,646 82.5 14.7
SSA 146 10.5 0.3 244 17.6 0.7 304 21.9 1.0 432 31.1 2.0 1,239 89.4 42.6
     
China 0 0.0 0.0 15 1.0 0.0 29 2.0 0.0 60 4.1 0.0 510 35.1 1.9
India 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.1 0.0 49 3.3 0.0 1,218 82.5 13.1
Current 
Classifications 
    
HIC  22 1.6 0.0 25 1.8 0.0 27 2.0 0.0 31 2.3 0.0 155 11.4 0.3
UMIC 38 1.4 0.0 67 2.5 0.0 90 3.4 0.0 141 5.3 0.1 1,057 39.7 2.6
LMIC 40 1.3 0.0 72 2.3 0.0 94 3.0 0.1 201 6.4 0.1 2,377 75.7 12.6
LIC 110 9.5 0.5 180 15.6 1.1 223 19.3 1.6 319 27.6 3.2 1,025 88.6 72.6
LDC 130 10.4 0.5 205 16.3 1.0 250 20.0 1.5 352 28.1 2.9 1,111 88.7 62.7
Fragile States 85 14.3 0.5 125 21.1 1.1 149 25.1 1.5 201 33.8 2.8 486 81.7 46.1
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Current income classifications (2014); Fragile States = World Bank definition; $10 figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz functions. 
All others based on linear model. 
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Table A8: The geography of poverty, by different ‘matched’ pairs of poverty lines, 2012  
 
 Poverty headcounts (% of global total)  Poverty headcounts (millions)
 $1.25 
(2005 
PPP) 
$1.44 
(2011 
PPP) 
$1.74 
(2005 
PPP) 
$2 
(2011 
PPP) 
$2.17 
(2005 
PPP) 
$2.50 
(2011 
PPP) 
 $1.25 
(2005 
PPP) 
$1.44 
(2011 
PPP) 
$1.74 
(2005 
PPP) 
$2 
(2011 
PPP) 
$2.17 
(2005 
PPP) 
$2.50 
(2011 
PPP) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  982 449 1,715 963 2,267 1,447
East Asia and Pacific  13.4 6.5 17.0 14.0 19.2 16.6  132 29 292 135 436 240
EAP exc China 6.2 2.0 7.7 5.2 8.5 6.6  61 9 133 50 192 95
Europe and Central Asia  0.9 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.5  9 8 19 14 30 21
Latin America and Caribbean 4.7 8.3 4.1 6.2 4.3 5.6  46 37 71 59 97 81
Middle East and North Africa  0.6 0.1 1.4 0.4 2.1 0.8  6 0 25 4 47 11
North America  0.5 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6  5 5 6 6 8 8
South Asia Region  36.4 26.6 43.2 36.8 44.5 41.4  358 119 741 355 1,010 599
SAR exc India 8.6 5.7 10.0 6.9 10.7 8.0  84 26 172 67 244 115
Sub-saharan Africa (SSA) 43.4 55.8 32.7 40.5 28.2 33.6  426 251 561 390 640 487
India 27.8 20.9 33.2 29.9 33.8 33.4  273 94 570 288 766 484
China 7.2 4.5 9.3 8.8 10.7 10.0  71 20 159 85 244 145
LICs 32.4 47.8 26.3 36.4 24.0 30.8  318 215 451 350 545 446
LMICs 54.6 37.8 58.7 47.0 58.9 51.9  536 170 1,008 453 1,335 751
LMICs minus India 26.7 16.9 25.5 17.1 25.1 18.5  263 76 438 165 568 267
UMICs 12.3 12.8 14.3 15.4 16.4 16.3  120 57 245 149 372 236
UMICs minus China 5.0 8.2 5.0 6.6 5.6 6.2  49 37 86 64 128 90
LDCs 34.9 49.0 28.5 37.6 26.1 32.1  343 220 489 362 593 464
Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
States (World Bank definition)  
14.5 22.8 10.5 15.3 9.4 12.3  143 102 180 147 212 178
Note: The poverty lines shown are matched pairs so $1.74 in 2005PPP is the same as $2 in 2011PPP. 
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Table A9: Estimates of the population living between $2.50 and $10 per capita, 1990, 2012 and 2030 (projection), 2005 and 2011 PPPs 
 2005 PPPs 2011 PPP
 Millions of people % of population Millions of people % of population
 1990 2012 2030 1990 2012 2030 1990 2012 2030 1990 2012 2030
Total 1,208 2,752 3,858 23.8 40.5 46.6 1,611 3,247 3,920 31.5 47.0 47.2
Total exc China 1,034 1,905 3,312 26.2 35.0 48.5 1,340 2,453 3,470 33.7 44.1 50.6
   
East Asia and Pacific  299 1,179 963 17.4 55.3 40.0 457 1,169 832 26.5 54.8 34.6
EAP exc China 125 333 417 21.2 42.6 43.8 186 375 382 31.5 47.9 40.1
Europe and Central Asia  296 221 169 35.8 24.7 18.4 281 191 138 33.9 21.4 15.0
Latin America and Caribbean  199 301 318 47.0 50.8 45.4 210 296 306 48.1 49.6 43.6
Middle East and North Africa  135 200 271 59.3 66.4 57.1 143 219 233 62.7 55.3 46.2
North America  26 27 27 9.3 7.8 6.8 27 28 29 9.8 8.2 7.2
South Asia Region  160 613 1,514 14.3 37.2 75.9 335 989 1,575 29.8 59.9 79.0
SA exc India 33 162 379 13.1 39.3 73.2 74 274 407 29.1 66.5 78.5
Sub-saharan Africa 92 210 595 19.2 23.9 42.9 158 356 808 32.2 40.0 58.3
   
India 127 451 1,135 14.7 36.5 76.9 261 714 1,169 30.0 57.7 79.2
China 174 846 545 15.4 62.7 37.5 272 794 450 23.9 58.8 30.9
   
LICs 56 175 614 14.5 24.1 53.1 76 280 706 19.4 37.7 61.0
LMICs 359 1,056 2,045 20.8 42.1 65.8 646 1,535 2,175 37.5 61.1 69.3
LMICs minus India 232 605 909 27.1 47.6 55.7 385 821 1,007 45.2 64.3 60.6
UMICs 563 1,353 1,062 30.1 58.9 39.9 672 1,288 915 35.7 54.1 34.4
UMICs minus China 389 507 517 52.6 53.6 42.8 400 494 466 53.4 48.0 38.5
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: $2.50 and $10.00 thresholds are in 2011 PPP. $2.50 figures based on linear model. $10 figures based on best fit of GQ or Beta Lorenz 
functions. 
 
 
 
